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ESSAY
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE DEATH
PENALTY IN TENNESSEE: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT
John M Scheb II* & Kristin A. Wagers"
The intense media coverage of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Baze v. Rees' and
Kennedy v. Louisiana2 highlights the ongoing saliency of
the death penalty in American politics. In this article, we
use empirical evidence to shed light on this controversy.
Our analysis utilizes data from 1,068 first-degree murder
convictions rendered in Tennessee between 1977 and
2007. 3 The questions animating our research are: 1) What
factors led prosecutors to seek the death penalty? and 2)
What factors led juries to impose it? In particular, we are
interested in the role that race plays in these decisions.
Does the system operate in a racially-neutral fashion, or is
it hopelessly infected with discrimination, as some prior
studies in other states have suggested?
*Professor and Interim Head Department of Political Science,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
**Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville
'Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. ; 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
2 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _; 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
3 This data is taken from reports submitted by trial judges across the
state in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 12, which requires judges
to complete detailed reports on cases in which defendants are convicted
of first-degree murder. SUP. CT. R. 12.
9
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Race and the Death Penalty
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
invalidated Georgia's death penalty statute and effectively
imposed a five-year national moratorium on capital
punishment.4  Concurring in Furman, Justice William 0.
Douglas characterized capital punishment in Georgia as
being "pregnant with discrimination." 5 Early social science
research has found substantial racial disparities in the
administration of the death penalty.6 "These studies found
that blacks were indicted, charged, convicted, and
sentenced to death in disproportionate numbers 
.... 7
However, these early studies were criticized for failing to
utilize adequate statistical controls. 8 Modem social science
research has found less evidence of discrimination due to
the race of capital defendants, but considerable evidence of
discrimination based on the race of murder 
victims.9
4 408 U.S. 238, 238-40 (1972).
5 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
6 See, generally, CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
NEGRO 368-70 (University of North Carolina Press 1940); Harold
Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter-and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27
Soc. FORCES 369 (1949); Elmer H. Johnson, Selective Forces in
Capital Punishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165, 169 (1957).
7 WILLIAM J. BOWERS & GLENN L. PIERCE, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH
AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, 69-70 (Northeastern
University Press 1984).
8 See Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A
Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the
Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REv. 783, 786-92 (1981).
9 See, e.g., Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion, Racial Bias,
and the Death Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69
SOC. SCI. Q. 853, 853 (1988); Richard Lempert, Capital Punishment in
the '80s: Reflections on the Symposium, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1101, 1106-07 (1983); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 587, 590-91 (1985); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of
Discrimination in Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case 
of
10
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Encapsulating this research, one author concluded that "the
death penalty is between three and four times more likely to
be imposed in cases in which the victim is white rather than
black.' Intersecting the race of defendants with that of
victims, researchers have found that black defendants
accused of killing white victims are most likely to be
sentenced to death." Some argue, however, that apparent
racial differences in the administration of the death penalty
can be explained in terms of other factors-that racial
differences disappear when appropriate statistical controls
are introduced. 12 Such control variables include the number
of victims, the defendant's criminal history, the relationship
Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279, 280 (1987); Gennaro F. Vito &
Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis of the
Factors Influencing Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483, 487-88 (1988).
10 Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of
Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 43, 47 (2000) (citations
omitted).
" See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 707-10 (1983); David C. Baldus et al.,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV.
133, 157-65 (1986); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and
Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South
Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 766-78 (1983);
Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the
Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 437, 450-70 (1984).
12 See, e.g., PUBLIC POLICY AND STATISTICS: CASE STUDIES FROM
RAND (SALLY C. MORTON & JOHN E. ROLPH eds., 2000); David C.
Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 498-500 (2002-2003);
Alfred B. Heilbrun, Jr. et al., The Death Sentence in Georgia, 1974-
1987: Criminal Justice or Racial Injustice?, 16 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
139, 151 (1989); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of
Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 44 (1991-1992).
11
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 12
of the defendant to the victim, the method of killing, the
location of the murder, the vulnerability of the victim, and
the "atrociousness" of the murder. 13
Indeed, some have argued that the way to minimize
the prospect of racial discrimination in the death penalty is
to ensure that it is applied only in the most atrocious
crimes. 14 Dissenting in McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice John P.
Stevens observed that
there exist certain categories of
extremely serious crimes for which
prosecutors consistently seek, and juries
consistently impose, the death penalty
without regard to the race of the victim or
the race of the offender. If [the State] were
to narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants to those categories, the danger
of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition
of the death penalty would be significantly
decreased, if not eradicated.15
Justice Stevens' view, at least until recently,1 6 was that an
infrequently administered death penalty, limited to only the
13 See, e.g., PUBLIC POLICY AND STATISTICS: CASE STUDIES FROM
RAND (SALLY C. MORTON & JOHN E. ROLPH eds., 2000); David C.
Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REv. 486, 498-500 (2002-2003);
Alfred B. Heilbrun, Jr. et al., The Death Sentence in Georgia, 1974-
1987: Criminal Justice or Racial Injustice?, 16 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
139, 151 (1989); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of
Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 44 (1991-1992).
14 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
15 Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
12
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We turn now to an examination of the death penalty
in Tennessee. We must stipulate at the outset that the
database we have employed in this research is far from
perfect. Evidently, some first-degree murder convictions
are not included in the database. 18 Also, there are variables
within the database for which a nontrivial number of cases
are missing. 19 It should be recognized, though, that in the
"real world" of social science research, datasets built from
official records are often less than perfect. After working
closely with these data for the past year, we do not believe
that these problems pose a serious threat to the validity of
our findings.
An initial examination of the data reveals that
Tennessee prosecutors sought the death penalty in 34% of
the 1,068 cases. In those 361 capital trials, juries returned
death sentences 44% of the time (160 cases). Thus, 15% of
the first-degree murder convictions we studied resulted in
sentences of death. In looking at these outcomes over time,
what is most striking is the decline in the proportion of
cases resulting in death sentences (see Table 1). Between
1977 and 1990, prosecutors sought the death penalty in
17 James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice
Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607,
1646 (2006).
18 John Shiffitan, Missing Files Raise Doubts About Death Sentences,
THE TENNESSEAN, Jul. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.hwylaw.com/CM/Articles/Missing%20files%20raise%20d
oubts%20about%20death%20sentences%2007.22.01 .pdf.
'9 For example, the race of 26 defendants contained in the database is
currently unknown. With respect to the race of the victim, the race of
65 victims contained in the database is currently unknown. However,
with a large number of observations, the missing data have relatively
little impact.
13
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53% of cases that resulted in first-degree murder
convictions. During the same period, juries returned death
sentences 55% of the time, so that 29% of first-degree
murder convictions led to sentences of death. By contrast,
in the period from 2001 to 2007, the rate at which
prosecutors sought the death penalty declined to 24% and
the rate at which juries returned death sentences dropped to
30%; thus only 7% of convictions in the 2001-2007
resulted in the death penalty.
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In Tennessee, 50% of the defendants convicted of
20first-degree murder were white; 45% were black.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, prosecutors were more
likely to seek the death penalty against white defendants
and juries were more likely to return death sentences in
cases involving white defendants (see Table 2 below).
Consequently, 19% of white defendants were sentenced to
death, as compared with 11% of African-American
defendants.
The story is somewhat different, however, with
respect to the race of the murder victims. As Table 2
shows, prosecutors were considerably more likely to seek
the death penalty in cases where victims were white.
Although juries were only slightly more likely to return
death sentences in these cases, the net result was that 18%
of defendants who killed white victims were sentenced to
death while only 10% of defendants whose victims were
black received the death penalty.
20 5% of defendants were of another race or their race was not recorded;
those cases will be ignored in this part of the analysis.
15
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First-Degree which Cases in Cases
Murder Prosecutor which Resulting
Convictions Sought Jury in Death
in Database Death Returned Sentence
Penalty Death
Sentence
White A* 50.4% 38.5% 48.8% 18.8%
Black A 44.9% 28.1% 37.8% 10.6%
White V** 64.0% 39.4% 44.7% 17.6%
Black V 33.0% 23.1% 41.0% 9.5%
White A/White V 52.4% 39.4% 51.8% 19.0%
White A/Black V 2.0% 21.1% 50.0% 10.5%
Black A/Black V 32.7% 23.2% 41.1% 9.5%
Black A/White V 12.9% 37.9% 29.8% 11.3%
Intersecting the race of defendants and victims
produces some interesting results (again, see Table 2).
Prosecutors were much more likely to seek the death
penalty when victims were white irrespective of the race of
the accused. Yet juries were much less likely to return
death sentences in cases involving black defendants and
white victims. The upshot is white defendants whose
victims were white were almost twice as likely as other
defendants to receive the death penalty. Obviously, other
* A = Defendant
** V= Victim
16
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factors beyond race are in play here. We turn now to those
other factors.
As shown in Table 3 below, there is an inverse
relationship between the frequency of a type of homicide
and the likelihood that it will result in a death sentence.
For example, nearly 40% of the first-degree murder
convictions involved killings committed in conjunction
with burglaries or robberies; yet less than 20% of these
convictions result in death sentences. Similarly, spousal or
domestic killings account for 17% of first-degree murder
convictions but only 12% of such convictions result in
capital punishment. On the other hand, prison killings are
very infrequent (less than 1% of our first-degree murder
cases), yet half the convictions of this type result in death
sentences. Killings by escapees are also rare types of first-
degree murder cases; yet convictions of this type are the
most likely to result in capital punishment.
There also appears to be a relationship between
"atrociousness" and the death penalty. Thus, homicides
stemming from sexual assaults on children and the elderly
are more than four times more likely to result in death
sentences than are drug-related killings and gang-related
killings. Prosecutors and juries may mirror community
attitudes in this regard-that murder victims who were
involved in gang or drug activity deserve less sympathy or
require less retribution than elderly persons and children
killed during violent sexual assaults.
17
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First- Cases in Penaltywhich Cases in Cases
Degree Prosecutor which Resulting
Murder Sought Jury in Death
Cnvitios Death Returned Sentence
Penalty Death
Sentence
1.3% 76.9% 90.0% 69.2%
0.4% 50.0% 100.0% 50.0%
1.3% 64.3% 66.7% 42.9%
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As Table 4 shows, the behavior of prosecutors and
juries also varies according to the defendant's motive.
Murders to escape apprehension or punishment, for sexual
pleasure or other gratification, or to silence a witness are
much more likely to result in the death penalty. On the
other hand, homicides motivated by racial or religious bias,
jealously, or hatred of the victim are least likely to result in
capital punishment.
19
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The method of killing also appears to be important
(see Table 5 below). Shooting, by far the most common
means of committing murder, is much less likely to result
in the death penalty than most other methods of killing.
Murders by drowning and throat slashing, which are
relatively rare, are most likely to lead to death sentences.
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As shown in Table 6 below, the location of the
homicide also affects the likelihood of capital punishment.
Murders committed in a field, the woods or some rural area
and those committed at the victim's workplace are most
likely to result in death sentences; while homicides
committed "on the street" and in vehicles are least likely to
receive capital punishment.
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The number of victims, too, has a substantial impact,
especially on the prosecutor's decision to seek the death
penalty (see Table 7 below). The net result is that when
there are three or more victims, the convicted murderer is
roughly twice as likely to receive a death sentence than
when there are only one or two victims.
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Not surprisingly, the defendant's criminal history
also plays a significant role (see Table 8 below) in the
likelihood of receiving a death sentence. In particular,
three or more prior felony convictions greatly increase the
chances of a defendant receiving a death sentence. This is
influenced more by jury behavior as opposed to
prosecutorial decision making. Interestingly enough, when
the prosecution sought the death penalty against individuals
with no prior criminal history (the majority of all first-
degree murder defendants), juries were least likely to
sentence such defendants to death.
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Conclusions
Ultimately, the best way to determine the impact of
race, or any other independent variable, on the behavior of
prosecutors and juries is to develop a multivariate model
incorporating various controls simultaneously. That project
is beyond the scope of this paper but will be the centerpiece
of a paper currently in development. For now, based on the
foregoing cross-tabulations, we can draw the following
conclusions with respect to the role of race in the
administration of capital punishment in Tennessee. First,
there are racial discrepancies, both with regard to
defendants and victims. However, the discrepancy with
regard to defendants runs counter to conventional wisdom
in that white defendants are significantly more likely to be
selected for and to receive the death penalty. The
discrepancy with respect to victims runs in the direction
suggested by the literature--defendants whose victims are
white are more substantially likely to be selected for capital
punishment by prosecutors. However, juries appear to be
less influenced by the race of victims in deciding which
defendants will be sentenced to death. Second, the data
suggest that numerous other factors influence prosecutors
and juries with respect to the death penalty. It may well be,
that once these other factors are incorporated into a
multivariate model, the effect of race will be substantially
attenuated.
25
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26
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 27
ESSAY
JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED:




In 2003, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the importance of diversity in legal education when it
decided Grutter v. Bollinger.' Underlying the Court's
decision was the recognition that a diverse student body
benefits the education of all law students, which in turn,
impacts society in important ways.2 While recognition of
educational diversity as a compelling state interest allows
law schools to consider race in admissions, race-based
admissions policies alone cannot address the truly
compelling state interest underlying educational diversity:
training lawyers to practice in a multicultural society,
including effectively representing clients from different
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Law
schools must do more than simply attempt to create diverse
classrooms. Law schools must implement cross-cultural
education to teach law students the skills necessary to
understand cultural differences and to effectively
* Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law; A.B.,
Brown University, 1988; J.D., Washington University in St. Louis,
1993. I would like to thank Arnie Thurber of the National Coalition
Building Institute and Professors Larry Howell and J. Martin Burke for
their insightful comments to earlier drafts of this article. Finally, I owe
many thanks to Jessie Lundberg for her outstanding research assistance.
1 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
2 See id at 330.
27
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communicate with clients and colleagues whose cultural
backgrounds differ from their own.
Several years ago, the medical profession
recognized that its professionals, while not overtly racist,
reflect the prejudicial attitudes and perceptions prevalent in
American society. 3 As a result of doctors' and nurses'
prejudices, stereotypes, and biases, American racial and
ethnic minorities receive lower quality healthcare than
white Americans, independent of insurance status, income,
education, or other factors that influence access to
healthcare. 4 In response to that disturbing finding, the
medical profession called for the inclusion of cross-cultural
education into medical school curricula. 5 The American
Medical Association (AMA) subsequently adopted 6 cross-
cultural education standards for all medical schools seeking
accreditation. 7  The same societal biases influencing
medical professionals influence lawyers, perhaps to an even
greater degree given the legal system's central place of
power in American society. Yet, the legal profession has
not undertaken a similar self-assessment.
Given the changing demographics in the United
States and law schools, the time is ripe to reassess what law
students need to know to be effective advocates in our
multicultural society. In Grutter, the Supreme Court
focused on the importance of the diversity of the next
3 INST. of MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 76-77, 79 (Brian D. Smedley et
al. eds., 2003) ("Unequal Treatment").
4id.
5 See Patricia A. Thomas, Leading through Diversity-My Version of
the Dream: Comfortable Shoes, SELAM INT'L NEWS, July 2002, at 12,
13.
6id.
7 LIAISON COMM. ON MED. EDUC., FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A
MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE 15 (June 2007)
(standards ED-20 and ED-21) ("LCME Cultural Competency
Standards").
28
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generation of law students. 8  The United States Census
Bureau predicts that the demographics of the United States
will undergo a massive transformation in the next forty
years. 9 By 2050, the United States will be a "minority-
majority" country in which non-Hispanic white Americans
will become a plurality rather than the majority
population. 10  Future generations of law students will
represent an increasingly diverse population of clients.
Without cross-cultural education, lawyers will lack the
basic skills needed to fulfill their ethical obligation of
competent representation, and the legal profession will
continue to reflect societal prejudice toward minorities,
rather than fulfill the American Bar Association's
command to rid the profession of discrimination based on
race and ethnicity. 11
Currently, momentum is building toward retooling
legal education in the United States. In the past year alone,
two major assessments of legal education were released:
Best Practices for Legal Education12 by the Clinical Legal
Education Association (CLEA) and Educating Lawyers
13
by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching. Both of these reports advocate the need to
8 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ("The Court expects that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today.").
9 U.S. Census Bureau, The Face of Our Population (Oct. 13, 2004),
http://factfinder.census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?-pageID--tp9 race-
ethnicity (" Face of Our Population").
1o Id.
" Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational
Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap 1992, A.B.A. SECT. L. EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS BAR, 141, 216-17, available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html (" MacCrate Report").
12 ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A
VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007) ("CLEA's Best Practices").
13 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) ("Carnegie Report").
29
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improve legal education to ensure the health, morality, and
competence of lawyers and the legal profession. In
addition, CLEA's Best Practices recognizes the importance
of cross-cultural skills for lawyers.
This article urges law schools to follow their
medical counterparts by incorporating cross-cultural
education into their curricula. Part II discusses the Grutter
decision and the Supreme Court's recognition of the
benefits of diversity to legal education. Part III highlights
the changing demographics of the United States and how
those demographics require immediate response from the
legal academy. Part IV considers the experience of medical
education. This section begins by exploring a study of the
medical profession conducted by the Institute of Medicine.
The section then addresses medical schools' response to the
Institute of Medicine report and the subsequent
incorporation of cross-cultural education into medical
school curricula. Part V addresses the recent assessments
by CLEA and the Carnegie Foundation regarding cross-
cultural competency of lawyers. Part VI argues that the
American Bar Association must take the lead and require
law schools to incorporate cross-cultural competency into
the education of America's next generation of lawyers.
II. Grutter and Educational Diversity
In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States
issued its opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,14 addressing
whether educational diversity in law schools constitutes a
compelling state interest. 15  The Court affirmed the
constitutionality of Michigan Law School's admissions
policy allowing consideration of race as a factor in order to
14 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
15 Id. at 322. The Court issued a separate opinion dealing with the use
of race in undergraduate admissions. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
30
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further the school's goal of creating a diverse law student
body. 16
Justice O'Connor, in drafting the opinion of the
Court, began by reviewing Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke17 that
educational diversity could constitute a compelling state
interest 18 According to Justice Powell, the "'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples." 19  Before Grutter, many
lower courts had interpreted Justice Powell's opinion as the
holding of the Court. However, in Grutter, a majority of
the Court held for the first time that educational diversity
constitutes a compelling state interest.21
In holding that the state has a compelling interest in
achieving diversity in its educational institutions, the Court
highlighted several "substantial" benefits of ethnic and
racial diversity. 22 First, the Court agreed with the district
court's finding that diversity in educational programs
"promotes 'cross-cultural understanding"' and helps
decrease racial stereotypes. 23  The Court found that
educational diversity "enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races."
24
16 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
"7438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23.
19 Id. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
20 Id at 321; see, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d
1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.")
(internal citations omitted)).
21 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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In addition, the Court found that educational
diversity produces professionals better trained to deal with
America's diverse population.25 The Court, quoting from
the amicus brief of the American Educational Research
Association, noted that "student body diversity promotes
learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals.'
26
Third, the Court identified the significant role that
diversity plays in the legitimacy of American leaders.
27
Harkening back to Justice Powell's connection of effective
leadership with cross-cultural understanding, the Court
stated that "universities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our
Nation's leaders .... Individuals with law degrees occupy
roughly half the state governorships, more than half the
seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of
the seats in the United States House of Representatives."
28
The Court continued in this vein, stating:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational
institutions that provide this training.29
Finally, the Court noted that educational diversity-
namely, law schools' ability to train students to understand
25 Id (quoting Brief for the Am. Educ. Research Ass'n as Amici
Curiae, Grutter 539 U.S. (No. 02-241)).
26 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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different cultures and effectively work with those
differences-played an important role in the future health
of American society and America's ability to realize its
democratic values:
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding
importance of preparing students for work and
citizenship, describing education as pivotal to
"sustaining our political and cultural heritage"
with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric
of society .... Effective participation by members
of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation,
indivisible, is to be realized . . . . As we have
recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts."
30
The Court's finding that educational diversity is a
compelling state interest, therefore, was premised on the
central place of law schools in educating lawyers, the
critical leadership role lawyers play in American society,
and the importance of American lawyer-leaders being able
to work effectively with a diverse population.
III. The Changing Demographics of the United
States and Law Schools
Due to dramatic changes in the racial and ethnic
makeup of the United States population, tomorrow's
30 Id. at 331-32 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1949)).
Interestingly, the Grutter Court left out the sentence immediately
preceding the language it quoted from Sweatt v. Painter: "Moreover,
although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that
it is an intensely practical one." Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
33
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lawyers will practice law in a truly multicultural society.
31
In one generation, America will be a "minority-majority"
country for the first time. 32 Four states-Texas, California,
Hawaii, and New Mexico-are currently "minority-
majority" states.3 3 Even in the legal profession, where
minorities are underrepresented,34 minority participation
has followed larger demographic trends. 35 As a result, the
next generation of American lawyers will be required to
maneuver cultural differences and intricacies, with regard
to both colleagues and clients, to a far greater degree than
any previous generation of legal professionals.
The face of lawyers' future clients is changing
dramatically. The current United States population is
roughly 300 million people.36  Non-Hispanic white
31 While race and ethnicity are just some of the many important aspects
of culture, the projected changes in this area merit examination.
Similar, but more difficult to quantify, changes are also taking place in
other aspects of culture: sexual orientation, family structure, and
gender, for example. Although this section focuses on race and
ethnicity, it should not be taken to mean that these are the only
important aspects of culture about which law schools needs to educate
future lawyers.
32 Face of Our Population, supra note 9.
33 U.S. Census Bureau, Texas Becomes Nation's Newest "Majority-
Minority" State, Census Bureau Announces (Aug. 11, 2005), available
at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/
population/005514.html. Both terms--"minority-majority" and
"majority-minority"-are used to describe the phenomenon of minority
populations exceeding majority populations. For purposes of this
paper, I prefer the term, "minority-majority" because it places the
emphasis on the minority populations rather than white population.
34 A.B.A. Commission on Racial & Ethnic Diversity in the Profession,
Statistics about Minorities in the Profession from the Census, Sept. 28,
2008, http://www.abanet.org/minorities/links/2000census.html ("ABA
Statistics about Minorities").
35 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Diversity in Law
Firms (2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/
diversitylaw/index.html.
36 U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey Data Profile
Highlights (2006), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/
34
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Americans constitute nearly three-fourths of that
population.37  Minorities make up the remaining one-
fourth, or slightly less than 100 million people.
38
According to the United States Census Bureau, by the year
2050, the United States will experience a 188% increase in
the Hispanic population, a 71% increase in the Black
population, and a 213% increase in the Asian population.
39
As a result, by 2050, minorities and whites will make up
equal portions of the American population.
40
Immigration also contributes to increasing diversity
in American society. The United States draws two-thirds
of the world's immigrants. 41 In 1940, 70% of immigrants
to the United States came from Europe. 42 Today, 85% of
immigrants to the United States come from Central and
South America,43 further adding to this country's diversity.
In addition to racial and ethnic differences, future
lawyers will face increasing language challenges in their
practices. According to the Census Bureau, nearly 20% of
the United States' population speaks a language other than





38 Press Release ,U.S. Census Bureau, Minority Population Tops 100
Million (May 17, 2007), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/population/010048.html. This figure probably
underestimates illegal immigrants, who may avoid participating in
census surveys.
39 Face of Our Population, supra note 9.
40 U.S. Census Bureau, Projected Population of the United States, by
Race and Hispanic Origin: 2000 to 2050 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/natprojtabo a.pdf).
41 American Medical Student Association, Cultural Competency in
Medicine, http://www.amsa.org/programs/gpit/cultural.cfm (accessed
Jan. 31, 2008) (citing RACHEL E. SPECTOR, CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN
HEALTH AND ILLNESS 169 (5th ed., Prentice-Hall 2000)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 American Community Survey Highlights, supra note 36.
35
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globalization, knowledge of languages other than English
will increase in importance.
The face of the legal profession is changing as well.
In the past twenty years, minority participation in law
schools more than doubled. In the 1984-1985 academic
year, minorities received 8.6% of all Juris Doctor degrees
awarded;45 two decades later, in the 2004-2005 academic
year, 22.4% of juris doctors were awarded to minorities.
46
While this trend has slowed-in the past eight years,
minority enrollment in law schools has consistently
hovered around 20% of total law school enrollment 47_
minority enrollment rates have not decreased, and continue
to show small increases each year. Despite these increases,
minorities remain underrepresented in the legal profession
as they currently represent one-fourth of the total United
States population.48
In August 2006, an understanding of the importance
of educational diversity and a concern about
underrepresentation of minorities prompted the American
Bar Association to adopt an accreditation standard
requiring law schools show a "commitment to diversity":
45 American Bar Association, Total Minority J.D. Degrees Awarded
1983-2004 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
statistics/charts/stats%20-%209.pdf.
46 Id.
4' LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 852,
856 (2008 ed.).
48 ABA Statistics about Minorities, supra note 34; A.B.A. COMMISSION
ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, MILES TO Go
2000: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION v (2000);
see also American Community Survey Highlights, supra note 36.
36
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Standard 212. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND
DIVERSITY.
(a) Consistent with sound legal education policy
and the Standards, a law school shall demonstrate
by concrete action a commitment to providing full
opportunities for the study of law and entry into
the profession by members of underrepresented
groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities,
and a commitment to having a student body that is
diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.
(b) Consistent with sound educational policy and
the Standards, a law school shall demonstrate by
concrete action a commitment to having a faculty
and staff that are diverse with respect to gender,
race, and ethnicity. 
49
49 American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, 2007-2008 Standards for Approval of Law
Schools 16 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
standards/20072008StandardsWebContent/Chapter%202.pdf ("ABA
Accreditation Standards"). In September 2007, this standard came
under attack from an unlikely source: the United States Commission
on Civil Rights. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Affirmative Action
in American Law Schools: Briefing Report 141-45 (2007); U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, US. Civil Rights Commission Warns that
Affirmative Action Might Harm Minority Law Students (Aug. 28, 2007)
press release, available at http://www.usccr.gov/index.html. In 2004,
the Commission, which is supposed to be a bipartisan panel, underwent
a makeover-after two of the Commission's four Republican members
switched their voter registration to Independent, President Bush
appointed two more Republicans, creating a Commission of six
Republicans and two Democrats. Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave
Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nationi/washington/articles/
2007/ll/06/maneuver gave bush a conservative rightspanel/; see
Daniel Levin, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the
Deputy Counsel to the President: Political Balance Requirement for the
Civil Rights Commission 1-2 (Dec. 6, 2004). Shortly thereafter, the
37
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At the same time, the American Bar Association amended
and adopted the following interpretations of Standard 212:
Interpretation 212-1
The requirement of a constitutional provision or
statute that purports to prohibit consideration of
gender, race, ethnicity, or national origin in
admissions or employment decisions is not a
justification for a school's non-compliance with
Standard 212. A law school that is subject to such
constitutional or statutory provisions would have
to demonstrate the commitment required by
Standard 212 by means other than those prohibited
by the applicable constitutional or statutory
provisions.
Interpretation 212-2
Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), a law
school may use race and ethnicity in its
admissions process to promote equal opportunity
and diversity. Through its admissions policies and
practices, a law school shall take concrete actions
to enroll a diverse student body that promotes
cross-cultural understanding, helps break down
racial and ethnic stereotypes, and enables students
to better understand persons of different races,
ethnic groups, and backgrounds.
Commission began to question the ABA's diversity standards and law
schools' affirmative action efforts, sparking harsh criticism from civil
rights and affirmative action advocates. Peter Schmidt, Civil-Rights
Commission Pressures Law Schools on Affirmative Action, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v54/iO2/02aO3601.htm; Martha Neil,
Government Report Pans Law School Affirmative Action, A.B.A. J.
(Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://abajoumal.com/news/govt-report_
pans law school affirmative action/.
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Interpretation 212-3
This Standard does not specify the forms of
concrete actions a law school must take to satisfy
its equal opportunity and diversity obligations.
The determination of a law school's satisfaction of
such obligations is based on the totality of the law
school's actions and the results achieved. The
commitment to providing full educational
opportunities for members of underrepresented
groups typically includes a special concern for
determining the potential of these applicants
through the admission process, special recruitment
efforts, programs that assist in meeting the
academic and financial needs of many of these
students and that create a more favorable
environment for students from underrepresented50
groups.
Given the recent adoption of Standard 212 and the
accompanying interpretations, minority enrollments in law
schools will likely continue to increase-albeit at less than
representative rates-creating greater diversity in future
law school classes.
IV. The Medical Profession
A. The Institute of Medicine Report
In 1999, Congress commissioned the Institute of
Medicine to assess disparities in healthcare received by
minorities in the United States. 51 Prompted by multiple
medical studies indicating that the health of American
50 American Bar Association Accreditation Standards, supra note 49, at
17 (emphasis removed).
51 Unequal Treatment, supra note 3, at 30.
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minorities contrasts negatively with that of white
Americans, 52 Congress charged the Institute to "assess the
extent of racial and ethnic differences in healthcare",
identify potential sources for any disparity found-
including discrimination and bias in the healthcare
industry-and make recommendations to alleviate the
issues.53  In 2003, after an eighteen-month study, the
Institute of Medicine issued its report, Unequal Treatment:
Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare.
54
The Institute's report confirmed that racial
minorities receive lower-quality healthcare than whites.
55
This disparity results in higher morbidity and mortality
rates among minority patients. 56 The Institute conducted an
extensive literature review and documented negative
disparities in care provided for cardiovascular disease,
cancer, HIV/AIDS, diabetes, and mental illness.57 The
Institute concluded that the disparities in health care are
"consistent and extensive across a range of medical
conditions and healthcare services [and] are associated with
worse health outcomes."
58
Significantly, the fact that minorities receive worse
healthcare is independent of insurance status, income,
education, and other access issues.59 The Institute found
that healthcare provider bias, stereotyping, prejudice, and
clinical uncertainty significantly contributed to the
healthcare disparities. While the Institute of Medicine did
not find evidence of overt racism on the part of doctors and
nurses, the report documented that medical professionals'
5 2 See id at 29-30.
53 1d at30.
54 See generally id.
55Id at29.
56 Id.
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unconscious attitudes, stemming from America's history of
racial discrimination and socialization in a racist society,
impacted the quality of care:
Racial and ethnic disparities in healthcare emerge
from [a] historic context in which healthcare has
been differentially allocated on the basis of social
class, race, and ethnicity. Unfortunately, despite
public laws and sentiment to the contrary, vestiges
of this history remain and negatively affect the
current context of healthcare delivery. And
despite the considerable economic, social, and
political progress of racial and ethnic minorities,
evidence of racism and discrimination remains in
many sectors of American life.6 '
In reaching this conclusion, the Institute of
Medicine recognized that discrimination in the healthcare
profession could not be separated from the larger social,
political, and economic context of American society. 6' The
Institute of Medicine examined American racial attitudes,
drawing heavily from the work of social scientists such as
Lawrence Bobo. 63 In his work, Bobo documented that
white Americans tend to hold racist attitudes even though
they would not self-identify as racist or bigoted.64
According to Bobo, white Americans "continue to express
support for negative stereotypes of minority groups in
surprisingly large numbers."65  Bobo's findings are
supported by the results of the 1990 General Social Survey,
which found that whites held negative views towards
blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. 66 Specifically, a
61 Id. at 123.
62 Id. at 91.




66 Id. at 93.
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majority of whites viewed blacks as being less intelligent
and more prone to violence. Nearly two-thirds of whites
believed that blacks are lazier than whites, and over three-
quarters of whites rated blacks as preferring to live off of
welfare as compared to whites.67  White Americans
exhibited similar trends in their attitudes toward Hispanics
and Asian Americans. 68  These findings have also been
confirmed by Project Implicit's on-going study of attitudes,
biases, and stereotypes. A joint project between Harvard
University, the University of Washington, and the
University of Virginia, Project Implicit documents that
"75-80 percent of self-identified whites and Asians show
an implicit preference" for whites as opposed to blacks.
69
Not surprisingly, while white Americans did not
self-identify as racist, even when holding negative attitudes
toward other Americans based on race, white Americans
held profoundly different views as to the prevalence and
source of racial discrimination in America. Compared to
minorities, whites tend to see America as more egalitarian
and view racism as isolated incidents rather than part of the
fabric of American society. 71 Moreover, "[minorities] not
only perceive more discrimination, they also see it as more
'institutional' in character ... [whereas] many whites tend
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Project Implicit, General Information, available at
http://www.projectimplicit.net/generalinfo.php (last visited Mar. 14,
2008); see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 84 (2005) ("[M]ore than 80 percent of
all those who have ever taken the [Implicit Association Test] end up
having pro-white associations, meaning that it takes them measurably
longer to complete answers when they are required to put good words
into the "Black" category than when they are required to link bad
things with black people.").
70 Project Implicit, supra note 69 (finding that people who harbor
negative associations towards various social groups also self-perceive
as being without bias).
71 d
42
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to think of discrimination as either mainly a historical
legacy of the past or as the idiosyncratic behavior of the
isolated bigot.,
72
In 2001, the Washington Post, the Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, and Harvard University released results
of a study on racial attitudes in America.73 The study found
that "whether out of hostility, indifference, or simple lack
of knowledge, large numbers of white Americans
incorrectly believe that blacks are as well off as whites in
terms of their jobs, incomes, schooling, and healthcare."
74
These findings parallel those from a study
conducted in the late 1990s examining the perceptions of a
class of medical students regarding diversity and its effects
in their school.75 Students overwhelmingly reported that
diversity of gender, race, sexual orientation, culture, and
class were simply not an issue in medical school.76 One
class concluded that racism and sexism were not problems
because their class was "racially diverse and gender-
balanced., 77 Most students reported that lesbians and gays
could comfortably be open about their sexual orientation,
but did not think there were any lesbian or gay students in
their class. 78  Most students reported that none of their
classmates came from poverty or a working class
background, while in reality 15% of the class reported
72 Unequal Treatment, supra note 3, at 94, (quoting Lawrence D. Bobo,
Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in
AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 281
(N.J. Smelser et al., eds, National Academy Press 2001)).
73 Unequal Treatment, supra note 3, at 94.
74 Id. (quoting Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of
Blacks, WASH. POST (July 11, 2001, at AO1)).
75 Brenda L. Beagan, Teaching Social and Cultural Awareness to
Medical Students: "It's All Very Nice to Talk About it in Theory, But
Ultimately it Makes no Difference, " 78 ACAD. MED. 605, 605 (2003).
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coming from those backgrounds. 79  Finally, although
students denied the existence of prejudice or stereotypes
based on class, one finding was particularly telling:
students "suggested these are generational issues or
problems restricted to 'redneck' places and/or the
uneducated." 80
The Institute of Medicine drew several major
conclusions from the work of the sociologists who have
studied discrimination in America. First, American society
experiences a "lasting residue" of racism from its history of
legally sanctioned racism.81 This institutional racism exists
even though America is a society that "overtly abhors
discrimination." 82  Second, dominant white culture
generally espouses adherence to the values of equality at
the same time that it is blind to the inequality existing in
America. This split between reality and rhetoric poses
significant problems for American society because "[t]he
discrepancy between Americans' widely held values and
beliefs regarding the importance of equality and the reality
of persistent racial inequalities tears at the social fabric of
the nation and contributes to the gulf of understanding
between racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups."
83
In keeping with its congressional charge, the
Institute of Medicine did not merely document the
disparities in quality of healthcare based on race and
ethnicity. 84 The Institute also sought ways to overcome
those disparities and to address the gap between equality
rhetoric and reality. 85 Interestingly, one of the Institute of
Medicine's primary recommendations was not directed at
healthcare providers, but rather at educators of healthcare
79 Id.
80 Id. at 609-10.
81 Unequal Treatment, supra note 3, at 95.
82 Id.
83 Id at 3 7.
14 See generally id
85 See generally id
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providers. 86 The Institute of Medicine found that cross-
cultural education can improve the ability of doctors and
nurses to meet the medical needs of diverse patient
populations. 87  Based on this finding, the Institute of
Medicine made the following recommendation to medical
schools:
Integrate cross-cultural education into the training
of current and future health professionals.
Strategies should be developed to fully integrate
cross-cultural curricula into undergraduate,
graduate, and continuing education of health
professionals. These curricula should be
expanded to include modules documenting the
existence of racial and ethnic disparities in
healthcare, and the impact of social cognitive
factors and stereotyping on clinical decision-
making. Required, practical, case-based curricula
based on a set of core competencies, amenable to
evaluation, should be the desired standard of
training.
8 8
B. The Response of Medical Schools
In response to the congressional charge to the
Institute of Medicine and the Institute's report documenting
provider bias, medical education has embraced the need for
cross-cultural education for doctors. While acceptance has
not always been smooth, it has largely progressed in three
stages. First, the accrediting agency for medical schools
adopted cultural competence standards. 89 Second, medical
schools responded to the new accreditation standards with a
86 1d at 214.
87 id.
88 id.
89 Selam Newsletter supra note 5, at 13.
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variety of piecemeal approaches. 90 Third, several of the
primary governing bodies for medical education recognized
the need to move beyond piecemeal approaches and now
advocate for institutionally integrated approaches to cross-
cultural education.91 Medical education is currently in the
third stage, which has seen the development of more
sophisticated model curricula and assessment tools.
92
In 1999, before release of the Institute of
Medicine's report, the Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (LCME) proposed cross-cultural competency
standards for medical schools. 93 The LCME is the national
accrediting authority for medical education programs in the
United States and Canada, and is sponsored by both the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and
the American Medical Association (AMA).94 The LCME
proposed two amendments to the standards for the
educational program for the M.D. degree.
The first cultural competence standard stated:
The faculty and students must demonstrate an
understanding of the manner in which people of
diverse cultures and belief systems perceive health
and illness and respond to various symptoms,
diseases, and treatments.
95
The following commentary accompanied the proposed
standard:
All instruction should stress the need for students
to be concerned with the total medical needs of
their patients and the effects that social and
90 Cultural Competence Education, infra note 100.
91 Cultural Competency in Medical Education, infra note 101.
92 See generally id.
93 See generally LCME Cultural Competency Standards, supra note 7.
9' See generally id
9 Id. at 15.
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cultural circumstances have on their health. To
demonstrate compliance with this standard,
schools should be able to document objectives
relating to the development of skills in cultural
competence, indicate where in the curriculum
students are exposed to such material, and
demonstrate the extent to which the objectives are
being achieved.96
The second cultural competence standard LCME
proposed was:
Medical students must learn to recognize and
appropriately address gender and cultural biases in
themselves and others, and in the process of health
care delivery.
97
The commentary accompanying the standard stated:
The objectives for clinical instruction should
include student understanding of demographic
influences on health care quality and
effectiveness, such as racial and ethnic disparities
in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. The
objectives should also address the need for self-
awareness among students regarding any personal
biases in their approach to health care delivery.
98
These standards were adopted by the AMA and the
AAMC in 1999 and finally adopted by the LCME in




99 Selam Newsletter supra note 5, at 13.
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of cultural competence education.100  Much of this
education has been piecemeal and has taken the form of
lectures, interactive sessions, workshops, student
clerkships, elective courses, immersion programs, specific
clinical rotations, and language training.'
01
More recently, the AAMC and the Health
Resources and Services Administration of the Department
of Health and Human Services have criticized the
piecemeal approach, calling instead for a more fully
integrated model. 10 2 According to a recent report from the
Department of Health and Human Services, teaching
cultural competence in isolated contexts did not fully
address the goal of producing culturally competent doctors:
[T]his shortsighted view might yield students a
glimpse of cultural competency in the form of an
elective whose lessons are quickly forgotten in the
stresses of clinical training, but it will not do much
to create what is really required to forge change:
culturally competent medical education. It is only
with the whole picture that one can be effective.
When cultural competency isn't a thread that runs
seamlessly through all levels of a medical school
philosophy and curriculum, its importance is
underestimated and underexposed-those who
need training the most remain the farthest from the
experience.
In light of this assessment, these reports have called for a
more systematic, institutional incorporation of cultural
100 See Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., Cultural Competence Education 1
(2005) ("Cultural Competence Education").
101 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Division of
Medicine and Dentistry, Cultural Competency in Medical Education:
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competency throughout medical school curricula and
administrations.'
1 04
The AAMC now asserts that an effective cultural
competence curriculum mandates five institutional
requirements. 10 5  First, the curriculum must have the
support of the administration, faculty, and students.10 6 As
one professor of medicine noted, "[s]tudent resistance to
studying these issues in medical school finds quick and
comfortable companionship in institutions that marginalize
or undermine efforts to construct these educational
venues." 107 Second, institutional and community resources
must be committed to the curriculum. 10 8  Third, the
curriculum must be designed in collaboration with
community leaders. 10 9 Fourth, administration and faculty
must commit to provide "integrated educational
interventions appropriate to the level of the learner.""
l 0
Fifth, the cultural competence curriculum must have a
clearly defined assessment and evaluation process.111
Medical educators have recognized that cultural
competency efforts must address three components:
attitudes, knowledge, and skills.112  All are essential to
providing competent care to patients from diverse
backgrounds; none alone are sufficient. 113  Medical
educators have also recognized that cultural competence
104 See Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 1.
105 id.
106 Id. at 2.
107 Melanie Tervalon, Components of Culture in Health for Medical
Students' Education, 78 ACAD. MED. 570, 575 (June 2003).
108 Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 2; Tervalon,
supra note 107, at 575.
109 Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 2.
110 Id
111 Id.
1 Joseph R. Betancourt, Cross-Cultural Medical Education:
Conceptual Approaches and Frameworks for Evaluation, 78 ACAD.
MED. 560, 561 (June 2003).
113 Id
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requires more than memorization of facts and
characteristics about various cultures.114 Rather,
preparing students to become competent
practitioners requires that students learn to care for
those perceived as different from self; that they
learn to care as connected members of a
community and the larger society; and that
students learn to care with a commitment towards
changing existing social, health, and economic
structures that are exclusionary."
15
In addition to calling for greater integration of
cultural competency into curricula, medical educators have
identified certain shortcomings of cultural studies
models. 1 6 One example of such a model is the "cultural
sensitivity/awareness" approach, which focuses on
individual attitudes and attempts to transform them through
discussion of and exposure to different cultures. 117 Another
example is the "cultural competency" approach, such as
that adopted by the Institute of Medicine, which seeks to
decrease bias and improve services by teaching students the
characteristics of various racial and ethnic minorities.
1 18
Critics find both approaches naYve in their
assumption that the problem lies solely in, and is solvable
through, individual attitudes."19 The approaches are also
114 See generally Taylor, infra note 115.
115 Janelle S. Taylor, Confronting "Culture" in Medicine's "Culture of
No Culture", 78 ACAD. MED. 555, 558 (June 2003), (quoting M.K.
Canales & B.J. Bowers, Expanding Conceptualizations of Culturally
Competent Care, 36 J. OF ADVANCED NURSING 102-111 (2001)).
116 See generally Wear, infra note 117.
117 Delese Wear, Insurgent Multiculturalism: Rethinking How and Why
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criticized for their ethnocentric definition of "difference" as
"nonwhite, non-Western, non-heterosexual, [and] non-
English-speaking."' 120  The cultural competency approach
in particular raises a real risk of further perpetuating
stereotypes. 12  Lumping any group of people together
under common beliefs, values, and characteristics ignores
the reality that each individual is unique, and may or may
not share those traits with the group.'
2 2
Another criticism, stemming from both approaches'
focus on individual attitudes, calls into question their
resulting lack of inquiry into larger, institutional sources of
inequality. 123 One author, expounding on Henry Giroux's
concept of "insurgent multiculturalism,",124 explained:
[M]ost multicultural studies have kept the focus
off structures, institutions, and governmental
policies by limiting discussion to individual
attitudes. A more insurgent multiculturalism...
does not limit itself to "communicative
competence" or the "celebration of tolerance" but
shifts the discussion to power and the foundations
of inequalities. 
125
The author proposes that, in addition to learning about
specific racial, ethnic, and other groups, "students would
also learn to identify and analyze unequal distributions of
power that allow some groups, but not others, to acquire
and keep resources, which would also include the rituals,
120 Id.
121 Taylor, supra note 115, at 555.
122 Id at 555; Wear, supra note 117, at 551.
123 Id.
124 Henry Giroux, Insurgent Multiculturalism and the Promise of
Pedagogy, in FOUNDATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION, 195-212 (Eduardo Manuel Duarte & Stacy Smith eds.,
Allyn & Bacon 1999).
125 Wear, supra note 117, at 551, (quoting Giroux, supra note 124).
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policies, attitudes, and protocols of the very institution
educating them."' 126 By placing both care provider and
patient within a larger sphere of social and institutional
oppression, this approach addresses the tendency of cultural
competency studies to view non-dominant groups as the
"other. ' 127  Members of dominant society tend to see
"culture" as something "others" have, "in which . . 'we'
must become competent," 128 forgetting that culture is
something that belongs to and shapes everyone. Some
medical educators have suggested replacing the term
"cultural competence" with "cultural humility,"' 29 to reflect
that cultural learning is an ongoing process in which
everyone is both teacher and learner. Bringing systemic
and institutional factors into the picture provides students
with a better understanding of their patients' cultures as
well as their own.
V. Lessons for Law Schools
In response to overwhelming evidence that societal
biases negatively impact the healthcare racial and ethnic
minorities receive, medical schools dramatically altered
their curricula. Medical schools now require cross-cultural
education for all future doctors. While there has not been a
corresponding finding of provider bias in the legal
profession, the legal system is not immune to similar
societal attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities.
130
The legal academy should learn from its medical
counterpart and incorporate cross-cultural education in a




129 Taylor, supra note 115, at 556.
130 See generally Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:
Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413 (2006).
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Many commentators contend that legal education
has not changed significantly in the last hundred years.
The majority of law students are still taught to "think like
lawyers" using the Socratic and case study methods. These
methods were created long before legal practice was open
to minorities or women, when the make-up of the
profession closely resembled the power structure in society.
Momentum, however, appears to be building to re-examine
law school curricula. In 1992, the American Bar
Association (ABA) released its landmark study of legal
education, commonly known as the "MacCrate Report."
131
More recently, two major collaborative reports on legal
education were released: CLEA's Best Practices for Legal
Education132 and the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching's Educating Lawyers. 133 These
studies stress that the health, morality, and competence of
lawyers and the legal profession compel legal education to
wean itself from its total reliance on the casebook method
of instruction. Considering the changing demographics in
the United States and law schools, legal education must
reassess what law students need to know to be effective
advocates in our increasingly multicultural society.
A. The MacCrate Report
The release of the ABA's MacCrate Report in 1992
advanced calls for reform of legal education. The
MacCrate Report identified essential skills and values
needed for competent representation. The report viewed
the development of these skills and values as an
educational "continuum" starting with law school and
continuing throughout a person's legal career.
134
131 MacCrate Report, supra note 11.
132 CLEA 's Best Practices, supra note 12, at 5.
133 Carnegie Report, supra note 13, at 83-84.
134 MacCrate Report, supra note 11, at 8.
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Specifically, the report recognized that skills training for
law students and lawyers was lacking and called for greater
emphasis on skills training both in law schools and in
continuing legal education.
135
The Task Force that drafted the MacCrate Report
skills and values recommendations recognized the changing
face of the legal profession. The report identified that
minority participation in the legal profession was a
relatively recent phenomenon after years of exclusionary
policies and practices.136 Largely, the MacCrate Report
was responding to these discriminatory practices when it
called on bar associations and law schools to strive for
greater minority participation in the profession. 37 As a
result, the primary value expressed in the report relating to
diversity is found in Value 3 relating to improving the
profession. 38  Specifically, Value 3.3 stated a lawyer
should be committed to the value of "Striving to Rid the
Profession of Bias Based on Race, Religion, Ethnic Origin,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Age, or Disability, and to
Rectify the Effects of These Biases."'139 In its commentary,
the report stated:
Despite the substantial efforts of the organized bar
to eliminate bias within the profession, its effects
continue to be felt in numerous ways ....
Elimination of bias within the profession is
essential in order to preserve "public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality" of the
profession and "the system for establishing and
dispensing [j]ustice" which it administers.
140
131 d at 123-25.
136 Id at 23-26.
137Id. at 27.
138 Id. at 216.
139 i
d
140 MacCrate Report, supra note 11, at 217 (quoting A.B.A., CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Preamble (1908)).
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While the MacCrate Report's focus on diversity
primarily focused on increasing minority participation in
the legal profession, it did make passing reference to a
"cultural skill" needed for effective communication. The
report identified that lawyers must have the essential
communication skill of being able to "effectively assess the
perspective of the recipient of the communication (the
client, decision maker(s), opposing counsel, witnesses, and
so forth)."'141 The report noted that the lawyer must be
aware that "insufficient understanding of the other person's
culture, personal values, or attitudes" may hinder
communication.1 42  The report recognized that cross-
cultural communication could be an essential skill for
lawyers. However, it primarily dealt with diversity as an
issue of equal opportunity as opposed to an issue of quality
representation.
B. The Carnegie Foundation's Educating
Lawyers
In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching released a study, Educating
Lawyers. Preparation for the Profession of Law. 143 The
report determined that current law school pedagogy
emphasizes legal analysis over both practical skills and
professional development. This "triumph of formal
knowledge" over "practical knowledge" is largely a by-
product of the historical development of the American
university system and the law school quest for legitimacy
within the academy. 144 Currently, law schools excel at
developing students' analytical expertise. According to the
authors of the report, this success of law schools comes at
141 Id. at 173.
142 Id
143 Carnegie Report, supra note 13.
144 Id. at 7.
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the expense of greater development of other aspects of
legal practice and of full professional and human
development. 145
The Carnegie Report made two essential
recommendations to law schools. First, legal education
needs to reunite practice and theory:
Students cannot proceed very far in even their
technical mastery of the law without encountering
issues concerning matters of policy or the equities
implied in particular rulings or general rules.
Legal thinking naturally opens out onto the
concerns of political philosophy, ethics, and
religion, though.., the case dialogue's emphasis
on formal and procedural issues tends to convey
the view that a lawyer need not take matters of
policy or "the equities" very seriously. Yet, law
regulates the world of human activity. In this
way, it is quite unlike the physical or biological
systems underlying engineering or medicine,
which can be adequately described in abstraction
from intention and purpose. As we have seen, this
cultural and ethical aspect of the law receives far
less attention in the critical first year than its
formal, analytical features. From the point of
view of professional identity, the missing
complements to legal analysis imply the need for a
serious effort to re-integrate the severed
components of the educational experience. 1
46
Second, law schools must fully embrace their ability
and responsibility to form the professional characters of
future lawyers. According to the report:
145 Id. at 50-55, 78-79.
146 Id. at 83-84.
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The challenge is to align the practices of teaching
and learning within the professional school so that
they introduce students to the full range of the
domain of professional practice while also
forming habits of mind and character that support
the students' lifelong growth into mature
knowledge and skill.
147
Interestingly, the drafters of the Carnegie Report
recognized that an overemphasis on analytical skills tends
to remove the discussion to a level of abstraction that
overshadows essential cultural components of the issue or
dispute.14 8 As many commentators have noted, this has the
particular effect of removing issues of race, ethnicity, or
class from "legal" discussions. 149 The result is discussion
of legal doctrine as if it exists in a color-blind, classless
society. As the American Bar Association's Commission
on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Profession found in
its report, Miles to Go 2000: Progress of Minorities in the
Legal Profession:
Most law school curricula also ignore the history
of racial exclusion in the profession, and the role
of race, gender, and class stratification in the
development of all professions. Thus, most law
students graduate without any sense of how
seemingly neutral practices (and the rhetoric of
"merit" generally) can be used-in some cases
147Id. at 45.
148 Id. at 84.
149 See, e.g., Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal
Thought, in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique 48 (3d ed. 1998); Deborah L, Rhode, Missing Questions:
Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547,
1554-61 (1993).
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cynically-to protect professional and economic
turf.
150
The Carnegie authors, however, asserted that a "good
counselor ... is one who can enter the world of the client
with a legal eye and join the client there in order to
translate the client's problems into legal concepts, all the
while anticipating opposing counsel's likely arguments."
'1 51
While the Carnegie Report did not elaborate on what it
means to "enter the world of the client" or how to teach law
students this skill, the report's authors clearly contemplated
the skill as being critical to competent lawyering.
In its recommendations regarding the future of legal
education, the Carnegie Foundation compared law school
practice to medical school practice and asserted that law
schools could learn from medical education. According to
the Carnegie Report, medical schools use more of clinical
educational methods and less traditional classroom
instruction. 152 Medical schools have found that while
students still learn the substantive material, providing
context actually enhances their learning. 153 In addition,
medical schools have found that the clinical setting allows
a greater emphasis on professionalism and for personal
development to occur naturally:
This intensification of the practical apprenticeship
in medical education has also opened the way to
more authentic and powerful means of fostering
professionalism. Students grapple with real issues
of patient autonomy, inter-cultural
communication, responsibility for public health,
and the challenge of maintaining compassion in
150 Miles, supra note 48, at 29-30.
151 Carnegie Report, supra note 13, at 13.
152 Id. at 192.
153 Id.
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the press of a fast-paced medical environment.
When they confront these and related issues,
professionalism becomes tangible and visible to
them. Their teachers are models, for better or
worse, and opportunities to reflect on what they
are experiencing take on a new urgency.
Although medical educators believe their field still
faces serious unresolved problems . . . medical
education has been receptive to pedagogical and
curricular change to advance the goals of a more
seamless integration of theory, practice, and
professional responsibility. 1
54
C. CLEA's Best Practices
2007 also saw the release of the much-anticipated
Clinical Legal Education Association's Best Practices for
Legal Education: A Vision and A Road Map.155 Although
complementary to much of the Carnegie Foundation's
report, Best Practices starts from the premise that legal
education does not adequately prepare law students for the
actual practice of law. From this starting point, the report
identifies "best practices" that would allow a law school to
better fulfill this commitment to preparation for practice.
The report sets out best practices for setting curriculum
goals, organizing the curriculum, delivering instruction,
assessing student learning, and evaluating institutional
effectiveness. Best Practices also includes a "model"
curriculum for a three-year legal education. The authors of
the report hope to bring about fundamental changes in
current law school curricula and provoke further engaged
discussion about reform of legal education.
156
1541d. at 192-93.
155 CLEA 's Best Practices, supra note 12, at 5.
156 id.
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The CLEA report establishes that the first principle
for a law school's program of instruction should be a
"commit[ment] to preparing students for practice."'' 57 The
authors recognize that law schools are not fully committed
to this idea and that law schools do not adequately prepare
students to enter the profession. According to the report,
Most law school graduates are not sufficiently
competent to provide legal services to clients or
even to perform the work expected of them in
large firms. The needs and expectations of the
workplaces awaiting law school graduates have
changed since the traditional law school
curriculum was developed, even in the large law
firms that serve the legal needs of corporate
America. Research conducted by the American
Bar Foundation in the early 1990's reached the
following conclusion:
The [hiring] partners today, in contrast to
the mid-1970s, expect relatively less
knowledge about the content of law and
much better developed personal skills. It
appears that the law firms in the 1970s
could afford to hire smart, knowledgeable
law graduates with as yet immature
communication and client skills, place
them in the library, and allow them to
develop. Today there is much less
tolerance for a lack of client and
communication skills; there is perhaps
more patience with the development of
substantive and procedural expertise in a
world of increasing specialization.
15 7 Id. at 39.
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Potential clients should be able to hire any
licensed lawyer with confidence that the attorney
has demonstrated at least minimal competence to
practice law. Doctors' patients reasonably expect
that their doctors have performed medical
procedures multiple times under supervision of
fully qualified mentors before performing them
without supervision. Clients of attorneys should
have similar expectations, but today they
cannot. 158
Best Practices asserts that a critical component of
being prepared for practice is a greater commitment to
professionalism. 159  Therefore, law schools should teach
students "the values, behaviors, attitudes, and ethical
requirements of a lawyer and ... infuse a commitment to
them."' 160 The report extensively discusses professionalism
and attempts to define it with concepts like commitment to
justice, respect for the rule of law, honor, integrity, fair
play, truthfulness, candor, and sensitivity and effectiveness
with diverse clients and colleagues. In turn, the report
explores each of these aspects of professionalism.
While all of these are important ideas, this article is
primarily concerned with the idea that professionalism
includes cross-cultural communication skills. According to
Best Practices, law graduates must have the skills to "deal
sensitively and effectively with diverse clients and
colleagues.,' 161 The comments to this principle explain:
It is important for law schools to help students
develop their capacity to deal sensitively and
158 Id. at 26 (quoting Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools
and the Construction of Competence 27 (Am. B. Found., Working
Paper No. 9212, 1992)).
"91Id at 18.
161 Id. at 79.
161 CLEA 's Best Practices, supra note 12, at 88.
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effectively with clients and colleagues from a
range of social, economic, and ethnic
backgrounds. Students should learn to identify
and respond positively and appropriately to issues
of culture and disability that might affect
communication techniques and influence a client's
objectives.
62
The authors of the report identify two ways law
schools can develop students' cross-cultural skills. First,
law schools can "promote diversity" by having a "critical
mass" of minority faculty, students, and staff. In language
reflecting the Grutter decision and the Supreme Court's
discussion of the benefits of educational diversity, the
authors assert the educational benefits of greater minority
representation in all facets of the law school community:
As students progress through law school, they
identify and analyze their conscious and
subconscious biases regarding race, culture, social
status, wealth, and poverty through discourse with
their teachers and fellow students. They test their
own perceptions against those of their peers and
teachers. If the law school community is racially,
culturally, and socio-economically diverse,
students develop better understandings of the ways
in which race and culture can affect clients' and
lawyers' world views and influence their
objectives and decisions.
163
Second, the report asserts that "cross-cultural
competence" is a skill that can be taught and learned.164
The report suggests that students must be able to effectively
162 id.
163 Id at 89.
164 Id. at 88.
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communicate with people of diverse racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic backgrounds to be competent professionals.
As to how students should obtain these skills, the report
states that "[s]tudents can improve their cross-cultural skills
by practicing and honing throughout their professional
careers the five habits of cross-cultural lawyering
developed by Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters." 165 It is
interesting that the report seems to shift focus at this point
from the responsibilities of law schools to those of the
students. The report seems to suggest that the onus is on
students to develop these skills "throughout their
professional careers" as opposed to something that law
schools should be providing students. This is particularly
interesting given that Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters
clearly contemplate clinical professors incorporating these
"Five Habits" into clinical teaching.
166
VI. The Need for a Cultural Competence
Accreditation Standard for Law Schools
The recent experience of medical educators with
cultural competence is instructive for law schools and the
American Bar Association. Medical educators adopted
cross-cultural education to address deficiencies in delivery
of medical care and to develop fully competent
professionals for the future. 167  In addition, medical
educators learned that cultural competence must be
integrated throughout the curriculum to avoid
marginalization. 16  As a result, the accrediting body for
medical schools adopted cultural competency standards for
medical school graduates.'
69
165 Id at 88-89, citing Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-
Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
166 Bryant, supra note 158, at 35.
167 See Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 1-2.
168 Id. at 2.
161 Id. at 1-2.
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These lessons should compel legal educators to the
same conclusions. 170 To successfully develop competent,
professional lawyers, the ABA should adopt cultural
competence standards for law school graduates. An
accreditation standard will highlight the importance of
cross-cultural education, fully integrate it into the academic
program, and connect cross-cultural education to skills
development for competent attorneys. 17 1 When viewed as a
necessary skill for practice, students, faculty, and
administrations will see and accept the relevance and
importance of cultural competency, and law schools will
graduate lawyers ready to practice in a multicultural
society.
The ABA should adopt a cross-cultural education
standard akin to that currently required for medical schools.
The medical school accreditation standards require:
The faculty and students must demonstrate an
understanding of the manner in which people of
diverse cultures and belief systems perceive health
and illness and respond to various symptoms,
diseases, and treatments.
7 2
Medical students must learn to recognize and
appropriately address gender and cultural biases in
themselves and others, and in the process of health
care delivery. 1
73
170 See Carnegie Report, supra note 13, at 84.
171 See generally BRIAN D. SMEDLEY, ADRIENNE Y. SMITH, ALAN RAY
NELSON, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL & ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 203. (Inst. of Med. ed. 2003)(explaining
why cross-culutral education became an accreditation standard for
medical education).
172 LCME Cultural Competency Standards, supra note 7, at 15
(commentary omitted).
171 d. at 16.
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Combining the ideas incorporated in the medical school
standards and those advanced by CLEA's Best Practices,
law schools should be required to meet the following
standard:
Faculty and students must demonstrate an
understanding of the manner in which people of
diverse cultures perceive and respond to legal
issues and the historical role the legal system has
played in disparate treatment of racial, ethnic, and
gender minorities. Students and faculty must
demonstrate the capacity to deal sensitively and
effectively with clients and colleagues from a
range of social, economic, racial, and ethnic
backgrounds, including the ability to identify
issues of culture and difference and the skills to
effectively communicate with and advocate for
people from diverse backgrounds.
174
There are three reasons supporting adoption of a
cultural competence accreditation standard. First and
foremost, an accreditation standard will emphasize the
importance of cultural competence for lawyers. 175  The
Institute of Medicine study established that highly educated
professionals are not immune to societal bias and
prejudice. 176 This applies equally to doctors and lawyers.
In addition, the history of legal discrimination against
174 An alternative to a separate cultural competence accreditation
standard could be to add cultural competence to current Standard 302
(a)(4). Standard 302(a)(4) requires law schools to provide professional
skills programs. See ABA Accreditation Standards, supra n. 45, at 21.
As I have argued, cultural competence is a skill that can be taught and
that is essential for competent representation. In this way, cultural
competence could be integrated effectively into professional skills
courses such as trial advocacy, client counseling, and negotiation.
75 See Unequal Treatment, supra note 3, at 203.
176 Id. at 9-12.
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women and racial and ethnic minorities in the United States
further compels the legal system to address these issues.
As recently as fifty years ago, laws barred blacks, women,
Native Americans and others from equal participation in
society. 177  Many laws continue to provide for different
treatment of homosexuals. Finally, the face of society will
continue to change dramatically in the next half century.
By the year 2050, the United States will be a "minority-
majority" country. 178 Since the rule of law will continue to
be a foundation of our economic, social, and legal systems,
lawyers must be skilled in dealing effectively with
difference-differences of culture, race, gender, and
ethnicity.
Second, an accreditation standard will assist in the
effort to integrate cross-cultural education throughout the
academic program. 79  As medical schools experienced,
without integration throughout the curriculum and
administration, issues of culture are marginalized, 18 which
perpetuates societal bias and is counter-productive.
Students who have already developed an interest in cultural
differences from travel, family background, or language
instruction tend to enroll in multicultural classes. Thus,
those who would benefit the most from exposure to cross-
cultural education would not be required to receive the
training. In addition, without full integration into the
curriculum, faculty and administration are much less likely
to buy into the process.
Third, an accreditation standard can make explicit
that cultural competence is a skill that future lawyers-like
future doctors-need in order to be effective
177 See e.g., GERALD DAVID JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS JR., A
COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS & AMERICAN SOCIETY (Comm. on the
Status of Black Ams., Nat'l Research Council ed., 1989).
178 Minorities Set to be US. Minority, BBC News, Aug. 14, 2008,
http://news.bbc.ea.uk/2/hi/amencas/7559996.stm.
179 Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 1.
180 Id. at 2.
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professionals. 181  Certainly, CLEA's Best Practices
identified the importance of cross-cultural communication
skills to professionalism. In addition, Best Practices noted
that cultural competency is a skill that is teachable and
learnable.1 82 The author, along with Amie Thurber of the
Missoula Chapter of the National Coalition Building
Institute and Jonathan Dunbar, a local attorney and NCBI
trainer, recently developed and presented workshops to
public defenders on cross-cultural communication and
advocacy skills.1 83  The trainers developed a full-day
workshop that combined education about systemic
oppression with development of concrete trial advocacy
skills in the context of cultural difference. 184 Over three
days, the trainers presented the workshop to nearly 100
criminal defense attorneys, ranging in experience from one
to thirty years.' 85  After each workshop, the participants
completed evaluation and the res onse to the workshops
was overwhelmingly positive. Many participants
expressed that this was the most practical continuing legal
education seminar they had ever attended. 187 One person
expressed, "The content opened my eyes to many things I
had never thought of before."' 188 Another stated that the
workshop was "an aspect of lawyer education that is
usually overlooked."' 189 Ninety-seven percent of the
participants stated that the workshop would enhance their
ability to work with, and advocate for, diverse client
181 See Cultural Competence Education, supra note 100, at 1-2.
182 CLEA 's Best Practices, supra note 12, at 66.
183 Andrew King-Ries, Montana Public Defenders Advocate for
Justice, NAT'L COALITION BUILDING INST. MISSOULA NEWSL. (Nat'l.





188 Workshop evaluation (on file with author).
189 id
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populations. It is the author's opinion that because the
issues of cultural difference and systemic oppression were
placed within the context of advancing advocacy skills,
there was much greater acceptance of cultural difference
and recognition of its relevance to the practice of law.
In meeting a cultural-competency accreditation
standard, law schools should consider several lessons from
the more fully developed experience of the medical
profession. For instance, cultural competency should not
just be a week of cultural studies inserted into an existing
course, or even a stand-alone course. That makes it too
easy to compartmentalize cultural competency instead of
showing how it is an integral part of legal education and
lawyering skills. In addition to integrating cultural
competency throughout the legal curriculum, values and
skills courses like professional responsibility, client
counseling, and pretrial and trial practice provide logical
venues for students to increase their cultural knowledge,
learn and practice relevant skills, and gain a greater
awareness of how culture affects them and their clients.
VII. Conclusion
To date, legal educators have largely left cross-
cultural skills development to chance. Schools have
assumed that greater minority representation in classrooms
will translate into greater cultural competence for all
students. Unfortunately, law, like medicine, "with its
authority to define what is normal ... tends to strengthen
patterns of stereotyping and reinforce existing power
inequalities."' 190 Greater minority participation alone will
not provide sufficient skill development to adequately
prepare law students for practice in our increasingly
multicultural society. Law schools must stop leaving cross-
cultural communication-a fundamental skill for all
190 Wear, supra note 117, at 552.
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lawyers-to chance. It is only through the adoption of a
cultural competence accreditation standard that law schools
can effectively learn from the experience of medical
education and prepare competent professionals.
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NOTE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: A




On July 6, 2006, the Court of Appeals of New York
decided Hernandez v. Robles.2 At issue in that case was
whether New York's Domestic Relations Law violated the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
New York constitution by limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 3 The plaintiffs were members of forty-four same-
' J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The University of Tennessee College of
Law.
2 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
3 Id. at 6. The Hernandez decision was not the first decision to address
the issue of the constitutionality of barring same-sex marriage under
state law. Prior to the Hernandez decision, a number of states had
already ruled on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage restrictions.
In fact, by the time of the Hernandez decision, Arizona, Hawaii,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont had all been asked to
determine whether laws banning same-sex marriages violated their
state constitutions. Id.
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated and
remanded the Circuit Court's judgment. Hawaii's highest court
declared that "the burden will rest on [the state official] to overcome
the presumption that [the Hawaii statute] is unconstitutional ...."
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
went so far as to recognize that "barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the
Massachusetts Constitution." Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Vermont, in Baker v. State, held that same-sex couples "may
not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded
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sex couples who unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
marriage licenses in the State of New York.4  The case
began as four separate lawsuits in which the plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment against "the license-issuing
authorities of New York City, Albany, and Ithaca; the State
Department of Health, which instructs local authorities
about the issuance of marriage licenses; and the State
itself," for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, while issuing licenses to opposite-sex couples. 5 In
the end, the Court of Appeals of New York held that "the
New York Constitution does not compel recognition of
marriages between members of the same sex." 6 The court
emphasized that "[w]hether such marriages should be
recognized is a question to be addressed by the
Legislature" 7 and not by the courts.
persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry." Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
The Vermont court, unlike its Massachusetts counterpart,
explicitly left it to the Legislature to determine whether same-sex
couples would be granted such rights under traditional marriage laws or
under a new domestic partnership law. Id. The Court of Appeals of
Indiana held, in Morrison v. Sadler, that "the Indiana Constitution does
not require the governmental recognition of same-sex marriage ...."
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Similarly,
the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Standhardt v. Superior Court, held
that "the fundamental right to marry protected by our federal and state
constitutions does not encompass the right to marry a same-sex
partner." Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. 2003).
Finally, the Superior Court of New Jersey, in Lewis v. Harris, held that
its "statutory limitation of the institution of marriage to members of the
opposite sex does not violate our Constitution." Lewis v. Harris, 875
A.2d 259, 262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
4 Id at 5.
5 Id. In the original suits, the Supreme Court of New York granted
summary judgment for the defendant, and the Appellate Division
affirmed the ruling in every case except Hernandez. There the
Supreme Court of New York granted summary judgment for the
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The Hernandez decision is important because laws
affording benefits to married couples are wide-ranging.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) listed family law,
taxation, health care law, probate, torts, government
benefits and programs, private sector benefits, labor law,
real estate, bankruptcy, immigration, and criminal law as
areas where rights and responsibilities are automatically
granted to married couples. 8 Moreover, state and local
governments as well as private organizations provide
hundreds of additional rights based on marital status.
9
Without the ability to marry, same-sex couples are unable
to obtain benefits, which are automatically afforded
opposite-sex couples when they marry. In fact, the GAO
estimates that "[i]f recognition is given to same-sex
marriages . . . more than one thousand rights and
responsibilities of different-sex couples will be extended to
cover couples of the same sex."1  These statistics thus
make it clear that decisions like Hernandez have the
potential to affect every aspect of life for same-sex couples.
In addition, the Hernandez decision is important
because the New York Constitution's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses mirror the language found in the
United States Constitution's versions of those same
Clauses. Because the New York courts have used the same
analytical framework for Due Process as the United States
Supreme Court, the analysis would be the same."
Similarly, the New York Equal Protection Clause is no
broader than that found in the Fourteenth Amendment 2;
thus, this analysis is applicable to the United States
Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
8 American Bar Association Section of Family Law, A White Paper
Analysis of the Laws Regarding Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions,
and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 367-70 (2004).
9 Id. at 347-48.
oId. at 347.
11 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9.
12 Id.
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Keeping in mind that the analysis of this New York
decision parallels the federal constitutional analysis, this
note will show that the reasoning of the Hernandez
majority is flawed and that the repercussions of this flawed
reasoning are grave. First, I will explain why the
Hernandez majority made an unreasonable argument when
it claimed that the Domestic Relations Law can be
defended as a rational legislative decision. Second, I will
show that the Hernandez majority used an incorrect
standard of review in evaluating the constitutionality of the
Domestic Relations Law by using a rational basis test when
the proper standard for such a case is a strict scrutiny test.
Last, I will demonstrate that by applying the correct
standard of review, the New York Court of Appeals should
have found that the Domestic Relations Law violates the
New York constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.
II. Repercussions of the Hernandez Decision
New York's Domestic Relations Law was adopted
in 1909.13 The law limits marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 14  Specifically, §12 of New York's Domestic
Relations Law states that marriage requires "[n]o particular
form or ceremony . . . but [states that] the parties must
solemnly declare in the presence of a clergy man or
magistrate and the attending witness or witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife."1 5 Section 15(l)(a)
requires that certain duties be performed by the groom and
the bride." Additionally, §50 states that "[p]roperty . . .
owned by a woman at the time of her marriage . .. shall
continue to be her sole and separate property as if she were
"3Id. at6.
1
4 Id. at 1.
15 N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 12 (Consol. 2007) (emphasis added).
16 Id. at §15(1)(a).
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unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's
control or disposal nor liable for his debts."' 17 As the New
York Court of Appeal noted in the Hernandez decision, it is
clear that the original intent of the law was to limit
marriage to members of the opposite sex.18
The plaintiffs in the Hernandez case claimed that
the Domestic Relations Law violates the New York
constitution's Due Process Clause 19 and the New York
constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 20  However, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the Domestic
Relations Law does not violate the state constitution. As a
result, the court determined that there is no constitutional
protection affording same-sex couples the right to marry
under New York law.
21
The repercussions of this decision are significant.
Obviously one of the reasons that same-sex couples want to
marry is so that they, like opposite-sex couples, may
participate in marriage benefits. The benefits of marriage
are widespread; in fact, it is estimated that "[m]ore than one
thousand rights and responsibilities are automatically
accorded to couples based on marital status." 22 In 2004, the
GAO estimated that 1,138 federal statutes existed in which
marital status was a factor. 23  A number of states have
conducted their own studies and have found that while
"[s]ome of these rights and responsibilities can be
17 Id. at §50 (emphasis added).
18 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6.
'9 Id. New York's Due Process Clause states that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
20 Id. New York's Equal Protection Clause states that "No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this State or any
subdivision thereof."
21 id.
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replicated partially by private agreements . . . most such
rights and responsibilities cannot.,
24
Laws affected by marital status cover almost every
aspect of life. For example, marital status affects family
law.25 Rights that automatically apply to married couples
include the right to seek spousal support, the right to seek
custody and visitation, the right to adopt, the duty to
support one's spouse, the liability for family expenses, and
the automatic coverage of spouses under most automobile
policies.26 Taxation is also affected by marital status.27
The GAO lists the right to file jointly and the right to
transfer property between partners without tax
consequences as rights automatically afforded to married
couples. 28  Health care laws affected by marital status
include the right to automatically have access to medical
records and the right to hospital visitation.29  Married
couples are also granted reciprocal rights to make funeral
arrangements, dispose of remains, and consent to organ
donation.3 ° Marital status also affects probate. 3' Marriage
automatically confers protection from disinheritance to
intestate succession. 32 Under tort law, married couples can
seek compensation for wrongful death and loss of
consortium.
33
Additionally, government benefits and programs
automatically afforded to married couples include
survivor's benefits and military benefits. 34 In the private
24Id. at 367.
25 Id.








34 Id. at 369.
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sector, automatic benefits for married couples include
eligibility for life insurance and disability insurance, the
right to take sick leave to care for a seriously ill partner, the
right to family health insurance, and the ability to roll over
a spouse's 401(k) or other retirement accounts.3 5  Real
estate law is also affected by marital status.3 6 Eligibility for
tenancy by the entirety, homestead rights, rent-control
protections, and exemptions from transfer taxes are
automatically afforded married couples. 37 Spouses can file
jointly under bankruptcy laws. 38  Spouses can file joint
petitions to immigrate under immigration laws.
39
Additionally, married couples have protections under
criminal laws, including the privilege not to testify against
a spouse and the protection of domestic violence laws. 0
These privileges and protections illustrate that
marriage comes with an "extensive legal structure that
honors and protects a couple's relationship, helps support
the family and its children through an unparalleled array of
rights and responsibilities, and privileges a married couple
as a single financial and legal unit."
41
Fortunately, a few benefits afforded married
couples have been granted to same-sex couples in New
York.42  In fact, three New York cases, two executive
orders, and an act passed by the New York legislature have
granted same-sex couples some rights and protections. In




38 Id at 370.
39 Id.
40 Id
41 Jon W. Davidson, Winning Marriage Equality: Lessons from Court,
17 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 297, 304 (2005).
42 See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee
on Lesbian and Gay Rights, Committee on Sex and Law, and
Committee on Civil Rights, Report on Marriage Rights for Same-Sex
Couples in New York, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 70, 76-77 (2004).
77
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 78
Appeals declared that "the gay life partner of a tenant in a
rent-controlled apartment is to be considered a family
member under the rent control statute and entitled to
protection from eviction." 43 In another case, In re Jacob/In
re Dana, the Court of Appeals granted the right of "second
parent" adoptions to same-sex couples.44  The Court
explained that "second-parent adoptions can be granted
because they permit the creation of stable legal ties
between one partner and the biological or adopted children
of the other partner." 45  Additionally, in Stewart v.
Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., a
surviving same-sex partner was allowed to "honor his
deceased gay partner's preference for the treatment of his
remains, over the objections of the decedent's mother and
brother," despite a rule that "only the surviving spouse or
next of kin may determine disposition absent testamentary
directives to the contrary."
46
Additionally, two recent executive orders and an act
passed by the New York legislature granted New York
same-sex couples rights and protections. An executive
order, promulgated in 1983, prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation when "providing health
insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners of state
employees." 47 By 2001, health care benefits for same-sex
partners were made available to all state employees. 48 In
New York City, an executive order banning discrimination
based on sexual orientation was implemented.49  In
addition, the New York legislature enacted the Hate Crimes
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based on, among other things, discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
50
Despite the benefits that New York same-sex
couples have won, it is important to remember that none of
these rights were automatically afforded to same-sex
couples as they would be if same-sex couples could marry.
More importantly, while court decisions, statutes, and
executive orders may be able to grant same-sex couples
some rights, without recognition of their right to marry,
many of the benefits of marriage will remain unattainable
to same-sex couples. Therefore, it is clear that the
implications of decisions like Hernandez v. Robles are
momentous.
III. The Flawed Reasoning of the Hernandez
Majority
The majority's reasoning in Hernandez is flawed.
The majority uses an incorrect standard of review in both
its Due Process and Equal Protection analyses. By applying
the correct standard of review, the New York Court of
Appeals should have found that the Domestic Relations
Law violates the state's constitution. Therefore, under a
correct reading of New York's constitution, same-sex
couples should be allowed to marry, and the above-
mentioned rights should be automatically afforded to same-
sex couples.
A. A Rational Legislative Decision?
Although the focus of the Hernandez decision was
whether the Domestic Relations Law violates the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses, the Hernandez majority
first considered whether the challenged limitation could be
defined as a rational legislative decision. Because the
5oid.
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answer to this question is "critical in every stage of a due
process and equal protection analysis," 51 I will also begin
my analysis by exploring whether the challenged limitation
can be defined as a rational legislative decision.
In determining whether a there is a rationally related
government interest in a limitation, "[t]he crucial question
is whether a rational legislature could decide that [the
benefits of marriage] should be given to members of
opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex couples." 52  The
majority offers two justifications for conveying such
benefits to opposite-sex couples but not same-sex
couples.53 Both justifications are derived from the
supposition that marriage is important to the welfare of
children, 54 and both justifications are seriously flawed.
The majority's first argument is that "the
Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to
avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex
relationships. '"5 5  The majority explained that because
heterosexual intercourse can lead to childbirth, while
homosexual intercourse cannot, the legislature could
rationally decide that it should grant opposite-sex couples
the benefits of marriage, which creates stability in a child's
life.56  The majority then explained that the legislature
could rationally find that same-sex relationships are more
casual and more temporary than opposite-sex
relationships. 57 Thus, the legislature could conclude that
because "an important function of marriage is to create
more stability and permanence in the relationships that
cause children to be born," opposite-sex couples should be
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offered "an inducement-in the form of marriage and its
attendant benefits."
58
The majority's first argument is flawed for a
number of reasons. First, there is no evidence to support the
majority's assertion that opposite-sex couples have more
stable and less temporary relationships than same-sex
couples. In fact, this assertion indicates a misperception of
the gay and lesbian community in general and reflects a
bigoted and biased belief. Further, it is unjust and irrational
to place all homosexuals into a group as generally having
unstable and temporary relationships and then to base a law
on this generalization.
In addition, while it is true that homosexual
intercourse cannot lead to childbirth, it is also clear that
homosexuals can and do have children of their own. In
addition to having their own children, some same-sex
couples adopt children. Therefore, the majority's argument
that opposite-sex couples need or deserve the institution of
marriage because they can have children applies with equal
force to same-sex couples and renders the majority's
argument unpersuasive.
The majority's second argument is that "[t]he
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other
things being equal, for children to grow up with both a
mother and father." 59 The majority explained, "Intuition
and experience suggest that a child benefits from having
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what
both a man and a woman are like." The majority
concluded that this is a "rational ground[] on which the






61 Id. at 8.
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This argument is also seriously flawed. The
majority cannot believe that children will only be exposed
to male and female role models if their parents are in
opposite-sex relationships. Surely the majority would agree
that in addition to parents, people outside of a marital
relationship are also role models for children. Therefore,
while it may be true that an opposite-sex marriage would
automatically supply a male and a female "role model,"
male and female role models from outside of a same-sex
couples' marital relationship are still available to children
of same-sex couples. More importantly, even if parents
were the only role models available to children, there is no
reason to believe that having both a male and female parent
will automatically benefit children. Many would agree that
having two positive same-sex role models is better than two
negative opposite-sex role models. In such a case, the
welfare of a child would be better protected in a same-sex
home than an opposite-sex home.
Most importantly the majority rests its entire
argument on the incorrect premise that the function of
marriage is to promote the welfare of children. 62  The
function of marriage is not, nor has it ever been, to create
stable relationships for the benefit of children. While the
creation of stable relationships that benefit children is
definitely a product of marriage in many cases, the function
of marriage is not to promote the welfare of children.
Clearly not all couples marry to have and raise children. In
fact, there are many married couples who cannot have
children. In their case, the function of marriage cannot be
to promote the welfare of children. Additionally, many
couples are married for considerable periods of time before
they have children. Can the majority seriously make the
argument that the function of these childless couples'
marriages is to promote the welfare of children?
62 See id. at 7.
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Alternatively, if the function of marriage were
really to promote the welfare of children, then why not
reserve marriage for couples who have or intend to have
children? Even the majority would not suggest this,
because a rational argument could also be made that if the
function of marriage were really to promote the welfare of
children, homosexuals with children should be allowed to
marry as well.
B. Due Process and Equal Protection
Standards of Review
It is clear that the Hernandez majority's argument
that the Domestic Relations Law can be defended as a
rational legislative decision is flawed. This flawed
argument led the majority to conclude that the law is valid
under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. I will now explore the problems with the
Hernandez majority's Due Process and Equal Protection
analyses.
1. Due Process
When determining whether a right is properly
protected under the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to
64first define the right asserted. According to the
Hernandez court, the right asserted could be broadly
defined as "the right to marry" or narrowly defined as "the
right to marry someone of the same sex." 65 In determining
which "right" was at issue, the Hernandez majority looked
to the Supreme Court cases of Lawrence v. Texas and
63 Id. at 9.
64 See generally, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986).
65 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d. at 9.
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Washington v. Glucksberg.66  The Hernandez majority
claimed that these cases indicate that the "right" in question
should be defined narrowly as "the right to marry someone
of the same sex."
67
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that the right
in question should be defined broadly because a narrow
definition of the fight at issue would be arbitrary. 68 In
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that the right in
question should be defined narrowly because "the narrow
definition of the right at issue was based on rational line-
drawing." 69  Based on these Supreme Court cases, the
Hernandez majority argued that the "right" at issue in that
case was more like the "right" at issue in Glucksberg; thus,
the majority concluded that the right should be narrowly
defined.70
The Hernandez majority erred in defining the
"right" asserted. A closer look at Glucksberg and
Lawrence indicates that the Hernandez majority should
have used Lawrence's broad definition rule rather than
Glucksberg's narrow definition rule. The right asserted
should have been defined as the "right to marry." This is
because Lawrence overturns Bowers v. Hardwick,71 a case
where the Court used a narrow definition to define the fight
involved.72 Bowers's treatment of the Due Process Clause
mirrors Glucksberg's in at least three important ways.
73
First, both Bowers and Glucksberg held that the court is to





70 Id. at 9.
71 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
72See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
73 See Brian Hawkins, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due
Process since Lawrence v. Texas, 15 MICH. L. REv. 409, 415 (2006).
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to recognize a new constitutional right., 74 Second, both
required a court to "define the proposed new right in the
narrowest fashion possible, usually as the right to engage in
an activity specifically forbidden by the statute." 75 Third,
both "treat[ed] past decisions declaring new substantive
due process rights as protecting no more than the specific
right declared, rather than reflecting some overarching
constitutional principle." 76  Given these important
similarities in Bowers's and Glucksberg's treatment of the
Due Process Clause, it is clear that when Lawrence
overruled Bowers's narrow definition of the right involved,
Lawrence also implicitly overruled Glucksberg's narrow
application test. Therefore, the Hernandez majority
ignored Supreme Court precedent in choosing the narrow
definition over the broad definition of the right involved.
Supreme Court precedent actually requires the court to use
the broad definition of the right involved--"the right to
marry"-over the narrow definition.
Under a Due Process analysis, once the right is
defined, the next question is "whether the legislation
restricts the exercise of a fundamental right."77 According
to the Supreme Court, a fundamental right is one that is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
78
Because the Hernandez majority defined the right involved
as "the right to marry someone of the same sex," the
majority argued the right at issue is not a fundamental
right.79  It explained that "the right to marry someone of
the same sex" is not "deeply rooted" in our nation's history






17 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citations omitted).
78 Id at 720-21 (citations omitted).
79 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d. at 9-10.
'° Id at9.
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However, if the majority had properly defined the
right involved as "the right to marry" it is clear that the
Domestic Relations Law clearly restricts a fundamental
right. For, as the history of New York marriage law
indicates, marriage is deeply rooted in history and tradition,
even though it has undergone widespread changes over the
years. 8 1 In fact, even the Hernandez majority conceded:
81 The history of marriage laws in New York is not static, but reflects
adjustment and change. Not only have the marriage laws themselves
changed, but the understanding of what marriage means has also
undergone regular transformation. In fact, "marriage has undergone
near-constant evolution to the point that marriage today bears little
resemblance to marriage in the past." See Suzanne B. Goldberg, A
Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249, 251 (2006). For example, under the New
York Common Law, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
"the wife ... and her husband constitute[d] but one person." Id at 257.
This meant that once married, a woman's property and ability to
contract became her husband's. Id. In fact, in 1820, the Supreme
Court of Judicature stated, "no man of wisdom and reflection can doubt
the propriety of the rule, which gives to the husband the control and
custody of the wife." Id. at 258. However, "by the middle nineteenth
century, the institution of marriage had changed considerably." Id. In
1848, New York passed legislation allowing women to own property
independent of their husbands, and in 1849, the act was amended to
allow women to make contracts independent of their husbands as well.
Id. at 258-59.
In the 1850's and 1860's, New York passed the Earnings Act,
which "protect[ed] married women's savings deposits, ensur[ed]
married women the right to vote as stockholders in elections, and
protect[ed] a woman's right to sue and be sued and to keep her earnings
during marriage." Id. at 259. In 1908, New York Courts recognized
"the separate existence of a husband and his wife ... and [gave] to each
the same right and remedies." Id. at 260. The New York Courts also
struck down "[t]raditional requirements that a husband be joined to any
tort action against a married woman" and "recognized a married
woman's right to sue third parties for personal torts." Id. Soon after,
the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity under which "neither spouse
could sue the other civilly for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon the
other ... was written out of existence." Id. at 261-62. In 1954, the
New York Court of Appeals, "extend[ed] the abrogation of inter-
86
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"The right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental
right."
8 2
i. Due Process Under a Strict
Scrutiny Test
Had the Hernandez majority correctly defined the
right involved and correctly deemed the right to be
fundamental, the court should have proceeded under a strict
scrutiny test. This is because the Supreme Court has
determined that "classifications affecting fundamental
rights are given the most exacting scrutiny."83 Therefore, if
a fundamental right is restricted, a strict scrutiny test must
spousal immunity to include criminal cases so that husbands could be
convicted of larceny for theft of his wife's property." Id. at 262.
In 1958, the New York Court of Appeals upheld loss of
consortium rules, which traditionally allowed husbands but not wives
to recover for the loss of a spouse. Id. at 262-63. But the Court of
Appeals soon rejected this rule, holding that loss of consortium applied
equally to husbands and wives. Id. at 263. The doctrine of necessaries,
which held that "husbands, but not wives, were obligated to support the
family," was declared outmoded in 1989. Id.
In addition, "the treatment of sexual relations between spouses
as an element of marriage has also undergone significant change." Id.
at 264. Under the Common Law, "a man could have sexual relations
with his wife any time he chose," and the wife was presumed to have
given consent. Id. However, in 1984, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected this rule. Id.
Traditional rules regarding gender roles also changed. For
example, the Common Law rule that fathers "[were] entitled to the
custody of their children" was statutorily changed in 1860 to "grant[]
married women joint custody of their children." Id. at 266. By the late
1800's, the presumption that fathers should have the children "gave
way to a maternal presumption in child custody disputes." Id. at 267.
However, the New York Courts later declared: "[W]hile the role of
gender in making custody determinations has had a lengthy social and
legal history, it finds no place in our current law." Id.
82 Id.
" Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). See also, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966).
87
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 88
be applied. 84 When a strict scrutiny test is applied, the law
must "further a compelling government purpose" and
cannot be justified if there is a "less restrictive
alternative." 85 Under a strict scrutiny test, "the ordinary
presumption of constitutionality is reversed., 86 In such a
case, the government must show that there is a compelling
government interest in furthering the law or policy.
87
Applying the correct standard to the correctly defined right,
it is clear that the Domestic Relations Law does not further
a compelling government purpose.
The Hernandez majority defines the interest
involved as protecting the "welfare of children. ' 88 Under a
strict scrutiny test, the interest in protecting the welfare of
children must be compellingly furthered by the Domestic
Relations Law. As shown above, the Hernandez majority's
conclusion that the law is a rationally related legislative
decision is seriously flawed. The rationally related
legislative decision test is a lower threshold than the
compelling government interest test; therefore, it is clear
that there is not a compelling government interest in
limiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples.
Further, even if there were a compelling
government interest, there are less restrictive alternatives to
protecting the interest asserted. When determining whether
there is a less restrict alternative, the government has the
heavy burden of showing that the law is narrowly tailored
84 Clark, 468 U.S. at 461.
85 Regents of California v. Bakee, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972)).
86 OTIS H. STEPHENS AND JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME II: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 28
(4tb Ed. Thompson Wadsworth 2008) (2003).
87 Id.
88 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
88
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to achieve the compelling government interest.89 Common
sense shows that there are several "less restrictive"
alternatives to advance the interests that the government
asserts. There are numerous ways to protect the welfare of
children without limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
For example, to obtain the majority's goal of benefiting the
welfare of children through stable relationships, the state
could implement mentor or educational programs that teach
child-raising skills. For these reasons the Domestic
Relations Law cannot be justified under a strict scrutiny
test.
ii. Due Process Under a
Rational Basis Test
More importantly, even if the Hernandez majority
correctly defined the right involved and correctly deemed
the right to be non-fundamental, the reasoning would still
be flawed. This is because had the Hernandez majority
been correct in defining the right involved as "the right to
marry someone of the same sex" and had the Hernandez
majority been correct in defining the right as non-
fundamental, the law would still have to pass the rational
basis test.90 However, as explained above, the Hernandez
majority's argument that the Domestic Relations Law can
be defended as a rational legislative decision is flawed.
This means that even if the Hernandez majority was correct
in defining the right involved as "the right to marry
someone of the same sex" and even if the right is not a
fundamental right because there is no rationally related
government interest for limiting the right, the Hernandez
majority still should have found the Domestic Relations
Law violative of New York's constitution.
89 STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 86.
90 Id.
89
5:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 90
2. Equal Protection
The same determination of whether to use a rational
basis or strict scrutiny test under the Due Process Clause
applies to the Equal Protection Clause. The Hernandez
majority again proceeded under a rational basis test when it
should have proceeded under a strict scrutiny test.
The Hernandez majority believed that the Domestic
Relations Law does not discriminate based on sex.91 It
explained:
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples,
New York is not engaging in sex discrimination.
The limitation does not put men and women in
different classes, and give one class a benefit not
given to the other. Men and women are treated
alike-they are permitted to marry people of the
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex.
92
Finding no sex-based discrimination, the majority
proceeded under a rational basis test. This reasoning is
unsound. The Domestic Relations Law does discriminate
based on sex. It does not allow a woman to marry a woman
or a man to marry a man. Because of her sex, a woman is
not allowed to marry another woman, and because of his
sex, a man is not allowed to marry another man. In other
words, the sex of the individual seeking marriage
determines whether an individual will or will not be
allowed to marry his or her partner. This sex based
discrimination means that a suspect classification is
involved.
91 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10.
92 1d. at 10-11.
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i. Equal Protection Under a
Strict Scrutiny Test
When a fundamental right or suspect classification
is involved, a strict scrutiny test is applicable.93  As
mentioned above, the right involved, properly defined, is
the "right to marry"-a fundamental right. Additionally, as
explained above, the classification involved is suspect.
According to two constitutional experts:
Operationally speaking, strict judicial scrutiny
means that the ordinary presumption of
constitutionality is reversed; the government
carries the burden of proof that its challenged
policy is constitutional. To carry the burden,
government must show that its policy is "narrowly
tailored" to further that interest.
94
As mentioned above, the policy involved is neither
narrowly tailored nor does it further the expressed
government interest in promoting the welfare of children.
For these reasons, the Domestic Relations Law is
unconstitutional under New York's Equal Protection
Clause.
ii. Equal Protection Under a
Rational Basis Test
More importantly, even if there was no sex-based
discrimination, the classification must still pass the rational
basis test. In order to pass the rational basis test, the
Domestic Relations Law must be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The Hernandez majority argued
that the legitimate state interest is to benefit the welfare of
9' See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9' STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 86, at 455.
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children. However, as explained above, this argument is
unreasonable.
A classification does not meet constitutional muster
under a rational basis test, if (1) the purpose of the
challenged discrimination is an illegitimate state objective,
and (2) the means employed by the state are not rationally
related to achievement of the objectives. 95 In other words,
"where individuals in the group affected by the law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to the interest the
State has the authority to implement," the law passes
muster under the rational basis test;96 otherwise, it does not.
As mentioned above, there is no rational basis for such a
law; therefore, there is no rational basis for the
classification, and the law does not even pass the rational
basis test.
97
C. Alternative Standard of Review:
Intermediate Scrutiny
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that even if a strict
scrutiny test were not applied, an intermediate scrutiny
analysis would also be appropriate. 98  Intermediate
scrutiny "generally has been applied to discriminatory
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." 99  The
Supreme Court has held that "[t]o withstand intermediate
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental objective."'
00
The majority recognized that "[t]hose who prefer
relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who
prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not
treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may
9' Id. at 454.
96 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (citations omitted).
97 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 10.
99 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
100 Id.
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gain the status and benefits associated with marriage."'
01
Despite this recognition, the majority argued that there was
no gender-based discrimination in restricting same-sex
couples from marrying because the Domestic Relations
Law "does not put men and women in different classes, and
give one class a benefit not given to the other."'
10 2
According to the majority's rationale, "[w]omen and men
are treated alike-they are permitted to marry people of the
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex." 03
However, the majority misconstrued intermediate
scrutiny. The purpose of applying intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications is to bar the government from
discriminating against an individual based on his or her
gender. By barring same-sex couples from marrying, the
state of New York is clearly barring individuals from
marrying based on their gender. The state is saying, for
example, that because an individual is a woman, she cannot
marry another woman, and because an individual is a man,
he cannot marry another man. This is discrimination based
on gender classification.
When discrimination is based on gender
classification, the intermediate scrutiny test applies, and the
"proffered justification [must be] exceedingly
persuasive.' 0  As noted above, the majority's proffered
justification for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
is unreasonable. An unreasonable justification cannot be
"exceedingly persuasive;" therefore, the Domestic
Relations Law does not pass intermediate scrutiny either.
101 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11.
1021d. at 10.
'03 Id. at 10-11.
104 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1995).
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IV. Conclusion
The reasoning of the Hernandez majority is flawed,
and the repercussions of this flawed reasoning are grave.
Many benefits of marriage remain unavailable to same-sex
couples because their right to marry has not been
recognized. Same-sex couples are left with few options
with respect to gaining benefits that are automatically
afforded to married couples. Same-sex can wait for the
Court of Appeals of New York to overrule its own decision
or wait for the Supreme Court of the United States to take a
case and declare laws barring same-sex marriage to be in
violation of the United States Constitution, options which
are not likely in the foreseeable future. Alternatively, they
can convince the New York legislature to overturn the
Domestic Relations Law and grant same-sex couples the
right to marry under a new law. At this point, however, it
seems that their best bet is to petition the courts for
individual benefits, as has already been done in several
cases. Additionally, same-sex couples can lobby for
executive orders and other acts to protect their rights. Such
efforts, however, will never give same-sex couples the
array of rights that are automatically afforded to opposite-
sex couples when they enter into marriages. More
importantly, many rights are unattainable without the legal
ability to marry. Therefore, without a favorable decision by
the courts, it is unlikely that same-sex couples will receive
the benefits of marriage they deserve.
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